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NOTES
Federal Income Tax Deductibility of Non-Business Bad Debts
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942 business and non-business debts
were wholly deductible from gross income in determining the tax lia-
bility of the taxpayer.' The act of 1942 made an exception to this by
treating non-business bad debts as short term capital losses.2 This change
was made upon the determination by Congress that the grant of a deduc-
tion for bad debts had been extensively abused by taxpayers in taking
bad debt deductions where no debt in fact existed. Especially was this
true where the debt was not related to taxpayers trade or business.3 Be-
cause of the administrative difficulty in determining whether assets trans-
ferred from one person to another in a transaction unrelated to the trans-
feror's trade or business are in fact debts, 4 the most realistic solution was
to restrict the amount which could be deducted in such situations. There-
fore, in lieu of other suggested limitations,5 Congress, by the addition of
§ 23 (k) (4) to the Internal Revenue Code, placed a non-business bad debt
in the same category as a short term capital loss.
DEDUCTIBILITY OF A BAD DEBT UNDER § 23 (k) (4)
General Requirements for the Deducton-In order to come within
the provision of § 23(k) 6 the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to show
the existence of a debt in law and in fact. Much litigation has occurred
1. IxT. REv. CODE §23(k) (1941).
2. INT. REV. CODE § 23(k) (4).
3. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., Ist Session, 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 408, 409.
4. Ibid.
5. See suggestion by Mr. Paul, Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means
on Revenue Revision Act of 1942, 77th Cong., 2nd Session, p. 90 (1942).
6. The sections are as follows: "Sec. 23 . . . In computing net income there shall
be allowed as deductions . . . (k) Bad Debts (1) General Rule.-Debts which become
worthless within the taxable year; or (in the discretion of the Commissioner) a rea-
sonable addition to a reserve for bad debts; and when satisfied that a debt is recover-
able only in part, the Commissioner may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess
of the part charged off within the taxable year, as a deduction. This paragraph shall
not apply in the case of a taxpayer, other than a bank, as defined in section 104, with
respect to a debt evidenced by a security as defined in paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion. This paragraph shall not apply in the case of a taxpayer, other than a corpora-
tion, with respect to a non-business bad debt, as defined in paragraph (4) of this
subsection.
"Section 23(k) (4) Non-business bad debts.-In the case of a taxpayer, other
than a corporation, if a non-business bad debt becomes worthless within the taxable
year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from a sale or exchange,
during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months. The term
'non-business bad debt' means a debt other than a debt evidenced by a security as
defined in paragraph (3) and other than a debt the loss from the worthlessness of
which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business." The treatment of debts and
their worthlessness, applicable to both sections, is here necessarily limited. For fuller
discussion, see 5 MamTENS LAW OF FEDERAL IxcOmE TAXATION, C. 30 (1942) and
Supplement.
7. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1233, 1246 (1944).
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to determine whether or not, in a given transaction, a debt under this
section was established. The word "debt" has been defined as a "specific
sum of money which is due or owing from one person to another, not only
the obligation of the debtor to pay, but the right of the creditor to receive
and enforce payment." 8 From this general definition, and others similar
to it,9 several fundamental legal concepts have been derived. There must
be a debtor-creditor relationship in fact and in law,10 as determined by
the laws of the state in which the alleged debt arose; 11 the debt must be
legally owing to the taxpayer; 12 the debt cannot rest upon a contingency; ',
it cannot arise out of a breach of contract by the supplier of goods or
services,1 4 or out of unliquidated claims,15 or out of claims arising from
unpaid wages, salaries, rents, etc. unless the income from such items had
been reported; 16 there must be an expectancy shown for repayment to
distinguish it from a gift or contribution to capital.17 If the funds out of
which the debt was created had previously improperly escaped income
taxation, no deduction will be allowed.' 8 The alleged debt need not have
been a "wise" one,' 9 but a "foolish" transfer of assets may indicate an
intent to make a gift or a contribution to capital, and not to create a debt.
20
In a situation where the taxpayer is a guarantor or endorser, and is legally
obligated to pay and does pay the creditor, it is generally held that he may
deduct such payment as a bad debt if uncollectible from the debtor, even
though the debt due him was worthless when it arose.21 However, no
bad debt deduction was allowed where the taxpayer was the guarantor
of a corporate debt and the corporation was not in existence when he
paid the creditor,22 or where he had prior to payment purchased the assets
and liabilities of the debtor.2
8. J. S. Cullinan v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 930, 932 (1930).
9. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Park, 113 F.2d 352, 354 (3rd Cir. 1940) ("something
owed in money, which one is unconditionally obligated or bound to pay, the payment
of which is enforceable").
10. U. G. Orendorff, P-H 1942 BTA-TC MEm. DEc. 42,280 (1942) (contract
imposing debt invalid in state as against public policy).
11. Commissioner v. Park, 113 F.2d 352 (3rd Cir. 1940).
12. Anderson v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 482 (1945), aff'd, 156 F.2d 591 (2nd Cir.
1946) (debt owing to partnership, not to survivor of partner).
13. Wolff v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 622 (1932); J. S. Cullinan v. Commis-
sioner, 19 B.T.A. 930 (1930).
14. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1930).
15. Hanes v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 213 (1943).
16. U.S. TREAs. REG. 111, §29.23(k)-2 (1943).
17. Runyon v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 350 (1947); Young v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1941) (even if note given, must show intent for repayment) ; First
Nat. Bank of Tulsa v. Jones, 143 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1944) (advances made without
expectation of repayment, in some instances, may be deductible as business expense
under §23(a)).
18. Crouse v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 477 (1932).
19. Redfield v. Eaton, 53 F.2d 693 (D.C. D. Conn. 1931).
20. Young v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1941).
21. See, e.g., Ellisberg v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 463 (1947). State laws as to
guarantors, sureties, and indemnitors will be the determining factor.
22. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 431 (1947) (the court allowed deduction
as a loss under § 23 (e)).
23. Dreyfus v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1944).
Once a debt has been established to the satisfaction of the court, the
taxpayer then has the burden of proof of showing that the debt had value
at the beginning of the taxable year, and that it became worthless within
the taxable year.2 4  The language of the statute, "debts which become
worthless within the taxable year," has been interpreted to impose an
objective test of actual worthlessness within the taxable year .2  The
question of worthlessness is purely a factual question, "calling for a prac-
tical, not a legal test,"26 and it is therefore difficult to ascertain any pat-
terns in the decisions. The statement of a few holdings, though, may
prove helpful as guideposts. A reasonable effort must be made to collect
the debt, and such things as doubt as to collectibility 27 or unwillingness
of the debtor to pay are insufficient to allow a deduction s.2 8  A suit is not
necessary if it can be demonstrated by other facts that judgment could
not be executed against the debtor.29  The granting of additional credit
is a factor showing that the debt is not worthless.30 The taxpayer need
not worry about some possibility of future collection of the debt, for when
he has made "all reasonable efforts to collect . . . without result," 31 he
can safely take the deduction. The running of the statute of limitations
is not decisive, since it is a mere bar to an action and not the extinguish-
ment of the debt.32  The taxpayer may take the deduction prior to the
running of the statute of limitations if other factors demonstrate that the
debt had become worthless in that prior year; 33 also he may take the de-
'duction in a year subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations,
if it were established that the debtor had intended, after the statutory
period, to pay the debt.
3 4
As a matter of proof, the taxpayer must be able to point to some
identifiable event that occurred during the taxable year to demonstrate
that the debt became worthless in that taxable year.3 5 Some illustrations
of identifiable events are liquidation and dissolution of a corporate
debtor; 30 debtor having left country; 37 abandonment of venture by debtor
and no assets which could be attached; 38 and a succession of crop failures
24. D. F. O'Brien, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. 145,184 (1945).
25. Redman v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1946) ; H. H. Emmons, P-H
1943 TC MEM. DEC. 143,054 (1943).
26. F. H. Prince, P-H 1946 TC Mir. DEc. 46,168 (1946).
27. C. Kaufman, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 746,161 (1946).
28. Ibid.
29. Purvin v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 21 (1946).
30. Id. at 29.
31. Davis v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 538, 542 (1948).
32. So too with the statute of frauds and discharge in bankruptcy. Greenspon v.
Commissioner, 8 T.C. 431, 434 (1947).
33. E. Hymers, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. 144,407 (1944).
34. Dennison v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 806 (1945).
35. E. H. Spreckels, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEc. ff 46,025 (1946).
36. Hanna Iron Ore Co. of Del., P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. 7 43,526 (1943).
37. G. Linn, 4 B.T.A. 76 (1926).
38. L. Rector, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEc. 145,337 (1945).
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of a farmer debtor which resulted in his abandoning his farm.3 9 The
regulations 40 and the cases decided thereunder are not clear as to when a
debt of a bankrupt becomes worthless.41 The determining factor is always
at what period did the debt actually become worthless.
42
Section 23 (k) (4)-Non-business bad debts are considered short term
capital losses. Corporations are excluded from the provisions of
§ 23(k) (4), apparently because the bad debt deduction is less likely to be
abused by such inanimate bodies as corporations than by individuals out-
side of their trade or business. 43 Securities, as defined by § 23 (k) (3) are
also excluded, since by virtue of § 23(k) (2) they are taxed as capital
assets. Partial worthlessness is not deductible. The final part of the sec-
tion defines a non-business bad debt as a "debt other than a debt the loss
from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayers trade or
business." The crucial part of this definition is the phrase "trade or
business."
TRADE OR BUSINESS
The regulations promulgated under § 23 (k) (4) 4' and the report of
the Congressional Committee 45 state that the term "trade or business"
under § 23(k) (4) is to be determined in substantially the same manner
as under § 23(e) (1).46 The regulations promulgated under § 23(e) (1)
do not define trade or business and neither do the cases decided upon that
point.47 The cases generally hold, though, that trade is synonymous with
business. 48 The classic definition of business derived from Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co.,49 ". .. That which occupies the time, attention and labor of
men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit" is much too broad to be
useful and has on several occasions been limited to that case.5" Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion in Deputy et al. v. Du Pont,51 ex-
pressed annoyance with the litigation caused by the use of the term and
in a search for clarity and certainty of the law, proposed to define "trade
.or business" as "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling
of goods or services." 5 2 This definition is much narrower, and as appears
closer to the ordinary understanding of a business. It has been expanded,
however, where courts have felt that policy reasons justified a broader
39. J. D. Westenhaver, P-H 1944 TC M~aa. DEC. f 44,029 (1944).
40. U.S. T.A s. REG. 111, § 29.23 (k) -1 (b) (1943).
41. Watson v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 569 (1947) (when filed petition) ; Taylor-
Wharton Iron & Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 768, 786 (1945) (when adjudi-
cated a bankrupt).
42. Watson v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 569 (1947).
43. Note similar provision in INT. Rv. CODE § 23 (f).
44. U.S. TaRAs. REG. 111, §29.23(k)-6 (1943), as amended (1945).
45. Supra note 3 at 572, 573.
46. U.S. TaxAs. REG. 111, § 29.23(e)-1 (1943).
47. Neither do the cases restrict the meaning to the section of the code.
48. See, e.g., Schwinn v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1304 (1928).
49. 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1910) (involving the Corporation Tax of 1909).
50. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127, 131 (1941).
51. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
52. Id. at 499.
interpretation. Outstanding illustrations of this are cases where indi-
viduals in a close relationship to a corporation have been allowed deduc-
tions for losses, expenses or bad debts which they incurred in dealings
for the benefit of the corporation. For instance, a corporate officer and
director who engaged in unauthorized dealings for the benefit of the
corporation, was allowed to deduct the resulting personal loss, under
§ 23(e) (1), since it "proximately resulted and arose out of carrying on
his business as an executive officer . . .. " 5 Similarly, officers and di-
rectors have been allowed deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses,
under § 23(a) (1), made in carrying on the business of the corporation.54
A justification for these departures from Justice Frankfurter's sensible
definition is perhaps the policy of permitting a deduction for expenditures
made in the interest of the corporation by officers whose positions are
closely akin in responsibility and discretion to that of an individual pro-
prietor.
A different and more" uncertain situation apparently exists in the bad
debt section. In an early case, the Tax Court held that a loan to a cor-
poration by one of its officers was a non-business debt.5 5 Subsequently,
sole stockholders were allowed business bad debt deductions when loans
which they made to their corporations became worthless. In Maloney
v. Spencer,5 6 taxpayer created three corporations and leased to them food
processing plants which he had previously operated as an individual. He
agreed to and did provide adequate finances for the corporations by means
of guaranteeing loans. One-third of his time was spent fulfilling his obli-
gations as a landlord, and his duties as corporate president of the three
corporations consumed the remaining two-thirds of his time. He had no
other source of income. Taxpayer treated payments made on these loans
as debts due him from the corporation, and when they became worthless,
the court allowed a deduction of a business bad debt. The court's rationale
was that the taxpayer was in the business of acquiring, owning, expand-
ing, equipping and leasing food processing plants. Similarly, the Tax
Court, in the Campbell case,57 allowed a business bad debt deduction where
the sole owners actually loaned the money to their corporations, since the
court stated that they were in the business of "organizing and operating
such corporations." In Crofoot v. Commissioner,8 a later case, the Tax
Court had before it the problem of determining whether or not loans made
by taxpayer to a corporation in which he always owned a majority and
finally at least 99o of the stock resulted in a business bad debt deduction
when the loans became uncollectible. Taxpayer contended that he was
engaged in the business of the corporation. The court, holding that a non-
53. Dixon Fagerberg, P-H 1942 BTA-TC Mzat. DEc. 42,091 (1942).
54. E.g., Dixon Fagerberg, P-H 1942 BTA-TC MEm. DEc. ff42,091 (1942);
R. C. Holmes v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 865, 871-874 (1938).
55. Samuel Lanski v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1019 (1936).
56. See discussion of this situation in Maloney v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (9th
Cir. 1949).
57. Campbell v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 510 (1948).
58. 8 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 863 (1949).
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business bad debt deduction was proper in this situation under the cor-
porate entity theory, distinguished Maloney and Campbell on the basis
that there taxpayers were engaged in the business of organizing and
financing corporations. Since, in all three cases discussed above, the act
of the taxpayer was to loan money to his corporation or corporations, the
fact that the taxpayers in Maloney and Campbell owned more than one
corporation (and hence were said to be in the business of organizing,
operating, financing, etc. such corporations) would seem to be immaterial.
The confusion resulting from these three decisions calls for a clarifying
pronouncement by Congress or the Treasury as to the treatment to be
accorded bad debts in a sole stockholder-corporation situation. Further-
more, upon investigation, it should be determined whether or not a de-
duction such as that allowed in Maloney and Campbell has been used
extensively by taxpayers to hide capital contributions under the term
"debt" and thereby secure income tax advantages. 59 If this be so, serious
consideration should be given to the advisability of classifying all debts
of a corporation to its sole stockholder either as non-business debts or as
mere contributions to capital. 60 In favor of the former an analogy could
could be drawn to the purpose of the enactment of § 23 (k) (4), which was
to correct the abuses of the bad debt deduction caused by individuals in close
relationship in taking the deduction when no debt was ever intended.
Congress and the Treasury have put a further restriction upon the
deduction of a non-business bad debt. Reg. 111, §23(k)6 states that
"The character of a debt for this purpose is not controlled by the circum-
stances attending its creation or its subsequent acquisition by the taxpayer
or by the use to which the funds are put by the recipient, but is to be
determined rather by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt's
becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If
that relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business
in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless,
the debt is not a non-business bad debt for the purposes of this section." 61
59. Perhaps the most important tax advantage would be to secure a trade or
business deduction instead of a capital loss deduction under §§ 23(g) and 117.
60. Other interesting discussions of this problem are: Hanigsberg, Distinguishing
a Fully Deductible Loss From a Non-Business Bad Debt, 7 INsT. FE. TAX. 914
(1949); Note, Bad Debts: Business or Non-Business?, 5 TAX L. REv. 412 (1950);
Comment, Some Problems in the Deduction for Bad Debts, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 832
(1950) ; 63 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1949).
61. The same is found in H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 3 at 572, 573. Several
illustrations are also given. Briefly they are as follows:
A, an individual in the grocery business extends credit on an open account to B
in 1941. A reports on a calendar year basis.
(1) In 1942 A sells the business but retains the claim against B. In 1943 it
becomes worthless. This is a non-business bad debt.
(2) In 1942 A sells the business to C but sells the claim against B to D. In 1943
it becomes worthless, and at that time its loss is not proximate to any trade or business
of D. This is a non-business bad debt.
(3) In 1942 A dies leaving the business and the accounts receivable to C. In
1943 the debt becomes worthless in C's hands. This is a business bad debt.
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In other words, in order for the debt to be wholly deductible, the loss
which results from its worthlessness must bear a proximate relation to
the taxpayer's trade or business. For example, if A, engaged in the
grocery business, sold groceries to B on an open account in 1947, and
disposed of his business in 1948, retaining B's debt, which became worth-
less in 1949, the resulting loss is a non-business bad debt. 62  This result,
it is submitted, is not in accordance with the purpose of the enactment of
§ 23(k) (4). The policy of the section, it would seem, requires only that
the debt be connected with the taxpayer's trade or business.63 In accord-
ance with this thought, § 112 of the Revenue Revision Act of 1948 stated
that "The last sentence of § 23(k) (4) is hereby amended to read-'The
term non-business bad debt means a debt other than (A) a debt evidenced
by a security as defined in paragraph 3, (B) a debt arising in the course
of the taxpayer's trade or business, and (C) a debt, the loss from the
worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.' "64
The act, and consequently this section, did not become law. How-
ever, it is suggested, for the reasons above stated, that future revenue acts
should be expected to amend this section. The case of Cluett v. Com-
missioner,65 by dicta, bears out the above opinion. There the taxpayer
sold part of his stock exchange seat to L in consideration for the debt
of L. Later, while the taxpayer was still a member of the stock exchange,
L's debt became worthless. The Tax Court held that the loss was proxi-
mate to the taxpayer's trade or business, and stated further, as a basis
for its determination, that the "Legislative history . . . indicates that its
principal purpose is to place a limitation upon losses from bad debts, such
as loans to relatives or friends which had no connection with the business
of the lender." 66
TAXPAYER'S ALTERNATIVES
A taxpayer who incurs a loss from an apparent non-business bad debt
may find that he is still able to take a full deduction for it. First, within
the scope of § 23 (k), he may allege that the loss from the worthlessness
of the debt was incurred in his trade or business. "Trade or business,"
which is largely a factual determination, is relatively unhampered by legal
rules. Thus if a taxpayer has made a common sense determination that
his activity is a "trade or business", and the loss was proximate to that
(4) In 1942 A dies leaving the business to C, but the claim against B to D. In
1943 it becomes worthless, and at that time its loss is not proximate to any trade or
business of D. This is a non-business bad debt.
(5) In 1942 A dies, and while his executor is carrying on the business, the claim
against B becomes worthless. This is a business bad debt.
(6) In 1942 A, in liquidating the business, attempts to collect the debt from B
and finds that it is worthless. This is a business bad debt.
62. See note 61 supra.
63. See text at note 3 supra.
64. See 94 CONG. REc., Part 7, p. 9188 (1948) (Emphasis added).
65. 8 T.C. 1178 (1947).
66. Id. at 1179 (Emphasis added).
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trade or business, he may be able to satisfy the court that he comes within
the provisions of § 23 (k) (1), and thereby be allowed full deductibility
from ordinary income for his loss. If taxpayer cannot discern any reason-
able basis for alleging that the loss was incurred in his trade or business, he
may still get relief from the other provisions of § 23.67 Section 23 (e) (2)
states that a loss is wholly deductible from ordinary income when sustained
within the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise
"if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with [taxpayer's] trade or business." "Transaction entered into for profit,"
like "trade or business", is not defined by Congress, the Treasury, or the
cases, but receives a broader application.68 The primary purpose of the
transaction, though, must be for profit.69 An illustration of a transaction
entered into for profit is where taxpayer collected stamps primarily for
re-sale.
70
Reg. 111, § 29, 23(e) 1 provides that a loss to be deductible must
be evidenced by "closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable
events, bona fide and actually sustained during the taxable period for which
allowed." This is similar to the requirements for the deduction of a bad
debt under § 23 (k), since an identifiable event is necessary to show the
loss,71 and the loss must be sustained within the taxable period.72 It is
rendered more similar by the fact that, generically speaking, losses include
bad debts. For these reasons, border-line cases arise to determine whether
a loss or a bad debt deduction is proper in a given situation. It has been
held that bad debts and losses are mutually exclusive.73 This means that
if there is a valid existing debt, the taxpayer has little hope of securing a
deduction under § 23 (e). If the taxpayer has grounds for alleging that
the debt is not a valid existing one, and that the transaction is one which
was entered into for profit (or incurred in his trade or business), a deduc-
tion will be allowed as a loss. Examples of such situations are where a
corporate officer paid a disputed claim of the corporation under the
erroneous belief that he would be liable thereon; 74 where the corporate
debtor was not in existence when the debt was acquired; 75 where the claim
67. Very few occasions have arisen where a bad debt is confused with a business
expense. This possibility is therefore not discussed here. For an example of such a
situation see First Nat. Bank of Tulsa v. Jones, 143 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1944). Nor
is § 23(e) (1), dealing with losses incurred in trade or business, in point as a deduc-
tion thereunder requires dealing in a trade or business which by itself permits of a
full bad debt deduction.
68. Book v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEam. DEC. 101 (1949). Greenspon v.
Commissioner, 8 T.C. 431, 435 (1947).
69. G. F. Tyler, P-H 1947 TC MEA. DEC. 1147,058 (1947).
70. Ibid.
71. See text at note 35 supra.
72. See text at note 24 supra.
73. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); Lewellyn
v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243 (1927). But cf. Helvering v. Price, 409 U.S.
(1940). In some cases it makes no practical difference. Max Gross, P-H 1947 TC
MEm. DEC. 11 47,263 (1947).
74. Byrne, P-H 1945 TC MEM. DEC. 1145,282 (1945).
75. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 431 (1947).
is one arising out of a dispute 76 or breach of contract by the supplier of
goods or services; 7 and where forged notes are given to taxpayer.
8  If
there has been a compromise of a debt, no definite result can be forecast.
One line of reasoning is that the cancellation of the debt is an extinguish-
ment of it and therefore the loss to the taxpayer is deductible as a loss and
not as a bad debt."9 This reasoning would seem fallacious where the credi-
tor could not have recovered more than the compromised amount. A better
line of reasoning, perhaps, is that if the creditor is unable to recover any
mnore than the compromised amount, the loss should be deductible as a
bad debt; if the compromise is made, not because of the financial condition
of the debtor, but for other valid reasons,80 the loss should be deductible as
a loss; and of course, if the compromise is made for no valid reason, 8' the
loss should not be deductible at all.
8 2
CONCLUSION
One commentator has stated that an inequity exists in § 23 (k) (4)
since any profits made are wholly taxable, while losses are deductible as
short term capital losses.83 It is submitted that this analysis is erroneous.
While hardships may occur under the present law (especially since the
loss must be proximate to taxpayer's trade or business), they are more
than counter-balanced by the elimination of the usual bad debt deduction
in cases where taxpayers have severely abused the deduction, and the avail-
able proof of the debt is necessarily scanty. For this reason, a repeal of
the section, or an amendment to provide for full deduction of bad debt
losses in transactions entered into for profit,8 4 should not be anticipated.
However, an informative Congressional or Treasury pronouncement as to
the deductibility of bad debts in the sole stockholder-corporation situation,
'which has so far been the major cause of litigation, is urgently needed.8 5
Louis Savrin
76. Guggenheimer v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 789 (1947).
77. Lewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243 (1927).
78. Morris Plan Co. of St. Joseph v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1190 (1940).
79. First Nat. Bank of Durant, Okla. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 545 (1927).
80. Such as fear of a possible counter-claim.
81. Such as a mere forgiveness of the debt.
82. Hanigsberg, Distinguishing a Fully Deductible Loss From a Non-Business
Bad Debt, 7 INsT. FED. TAx. 914, 919 (1949).
83. Id. at 914, 915.
84. While such an amendment would bring § 23(k) into line with § 23(a) and
(e), it would destroy the usefulness of the section, since the usual deduction could then
be had by the mere addition of an interest provision. It must be remembered that
§ 23(k) (4) is a restriction on a deduction originally granted.
85. This problem is discussed in text at notes 56-60 supra.
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National Sovereignty Over Maritime Resources
On September 28, 1945, President Truman issued two proclamations
purporting to extend the jurisdiction and control of the United States over
a vast area of the sea which had theretofore been considered free to all
nations. One of the proclamations referred to the resources in the subsoil
and sea bed of the continental shelf; 1 the other affected fisheries in "areas
of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fish-
ing activities have been or in future may be developed and maintained on a
substantial scale." 2 These proclamations have received generally favorable
comment on the basis of their necessity and timeliness, but their foundation
in international law has received scant attention, at least from American
sources. Yet if the claims thus presented are to be maintained, their legal
background should be examined.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Our concept of free seas comes originally from Roman Law, but it was
then a quite different thing from the modem idea. Roman seas were "free"
to all Roman citizens as a matter of international law; but the only im-
portant sea was, in regard to international law (insofar as Rome acknowl-
edged the existence of such law), a Roman lake.3 Justinian accurately
draws the distinction in stating that the sea is not res nullius (a term prop-
erly applied only to things of divine right) but res communis-something the
property in which belongs to nobody, but the right of using which belongs
to everybody, and a portion of which may become the property of the first
occupant. 4 Rome, being the first occupant, was from an international point
of view sovereign over the entire Mediterranean Sea.
The idea that wide areas of the sea could be the object of State sover-
eignty lived long after Rome's own claims died. All through the Middle
Ages, Mediterranean States claimed jurisdiction 100 miles from shore.5
England made special claims beginning in the time of Edgar the Peaceful,
and insisted on salute from foreign vessels in the "British Seas" as late as
the seventeenth century.6 In the same era, Papal grants were the basis of
claims by Spain and Portugal to the entire South Atlantic, Pacific, and
Indian Oceans. 7 Denmark asserted dominion over all waters between her
homeland and Iceland, on the theory that ownership of each of the opposing
shores gave her special rights to all waters up to a line halfway between the
1. 3 CODE FED. REGS. Proc. 2667 (Supp. 1945).
2. 3 CODE FED. RE s. Proc. 2668 (Supp. 1945).
3. POTrTER, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 30-32 (1924).
4. I STuTS 2.1.1, 2.1.7.
5. BUSTAMANTE Y SIRVEN, THE TERRITORIAL SEA 5 (1930).
6. HiGGiNs & COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 38 et seq. (1943).
7. HERBET A. SMITH, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 3 (1948).
two-a theory which Plowden applied on behalf of England, in claiming
halfvay to Spain and the entire area of the English Channel
Plowden was, however, the voice of a dying school. Beginning with
Baldus Ubaldus (d. 1400), legal authorities limited a nation's right of
sovereignty on the high seas to the area within sixty miles, or roughly one
day's voyage, of the shore. 9 Subject to some qualifications, this was perhaps
the prevalent doctrine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at least
in the Mediterranean world; and by the end of the eighteenth even this
seemed too ambitious. Van Bynkershoek suggested limiting maritime
sovereignty to the area which could be controlled from shore; and his
"cannon-shot rule" was translated into the three-mile limit by Galiani-
three miles being the maximum range of guns conceivable at that time.10
Due in large part to Anglo-American support, this became the prevalent
rule during the nineteenth century, and Jessup asserts that it was "a rule
of international law" in 1927.1
But the three-mile limit must not be taken for granted. It is rejected
by the Scandinavian countries, the naval powers of the Mediterranean, most
of Latin America, and Russia.12  Even the States which admit its validity
insist on exceptions for special purposes. Indeed, the United States, though
often given credit for the rule's acceptance in international law,'3 claims per-
haps the greatest number of exceptions. Thus a twelve-mile zone for
customs enforcement was set up by Congress in 1790; 14 and the 1935 Anti-
Smuggling Act provides for a zone extending fifty miles beyond the outer
limits of this customs area.' 5 In addition to these provisions, special
"defense areas" of varying size were proclaimed during both World Wars,
the maximum breadth of which was 53 miles beyond the three-mile limit.' 6
The United States also supported the Declaration of Panama of 1939, which
set up a neutrality area around the States members of the Pan-American
Union averaging 300 miles in width.1 7 The foregoing list does not include
8. Id. at 41; FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 541 (1911). Even Lord Chief
Justice Hale maintained that England had "right of jurisdiction or dominion of so
much at lest of the sea as adjoines to the British coast nearer then to any forren
coast." Id. at 543.
9. FULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 539.
10. Translation of "cannon-shot" into "three miles" is generally attributed to
Galiani, though Jessup appears to give major credit to Jefferson. JEssUP, LAW OF
TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICIoN, 7. See also Walker, Territorial
Waters: the Cannon-Shot Ride, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 210 (1945), to the effect that
Bynkershoek was speaking of the range of cannon actually in position on shore, and
not of a belt the width of possible cannon shot; on this theory the two ideas are unre-
lated.
11. JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 10, at 7. Contra: Borchard, Resources of the Con-
tinental Shelf, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 53, 61 (1946) ("there is no rule of international law
on the subject").
12. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12.
13. Walker, supra note 10, at 229; JEsSUP, op. cit. .rupra note 10, at 6.
14. 1 STAT. 145, 156 (1790), comparable provision now found in 49 STAT. 529
(1935), 19 U.S.C. § 1709c (1946).
15. 49 STAT. 517 (1935), 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1946).
16. 39 STAT. 1194 (1917), repealed, 62 STAT. 683, 862 (1948); NAVAL WAR COL-
LEGE, INT'L L. Doc's 67 (1943).
17. 1 DEP'T STATE BULL. 331 (1939).
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the right to patrol the Western Atlantic, implicit in President Roosevelt's
"shoot on sight" order of September 11, 1941 ; 1s nor the enforcement of
Prohibition within one hour's voyage from territorial waters, which was
based entirely on conventions with the nations against whom such enforce-
ment was exercised; 19 nor the claims of individual States, since these are
invalid without Federal consent.
20
Thus it is clear that if the three-mile limit is a "rule of international
law" it is so only for very restricted purposes. Indeed, the Hague Con-
ference failed because of disagreement on its validity.21  In this light, a
claim to resources in the entire continental shelf is not as great a departure
from established practice as it would seem. But before the proclamations
can be accurately evaluated, some analysis of their exact provisions must be
made. Attention will first be given to the claim respecting fisheries.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONES
The proclamation with regard to fishery conservation zones states that
it is "proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of the high seas
contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing activities have
been or in future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale."
Provision is made for establishment of joint zones where fisheries "have
been or shall hereafter be legitimately developed and maintained jointly by
nationals of the United States and nationals of other States." The right
of any maritime State to enforce similar policies, and the right of free and
unimpeded navigation through the conservation zones, are expressly
recognized.
22
The explanatory preface refers to "the inadequacy of present arrange-
ments for the protection and perpetuation of the fishery resources," espe-
cially in view of technological advances which have spread "intensified fish-
ing" over wide areas of the sea, in many cases constituting a serious threat
to the continued existence of certain species. This situation is undoubtedly
serious, and has been for some time.23 Technological improvement, ex-
panding markets, and the lack of regulation have made every member of
the fishing industry interested primarily in quick profits from large catches;
and the necessity of conservation, though recognized throughout the in-
dustry, has failed to result in satisfactory measures to insure sufficient future
supplies. Individual governments hesitate to take conservatory action
affecting fisheries outside the three-mile limit, since such action binds only
18. 5 id. 193 (1945).
19. See, e.g., that with Great Britain, 43 STAT. 1761 (1924).
20. Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States, 2 LA. L. REv. 252, 279 (1940)
Legis., 39 Cot. L. REv. 317, 324 (1939). But Federal consent would appear to follow
from the Acts admitting a few states to the Union. Id. at 323n.
21. Reeves, Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters, 24 Am. J. INT'L L.
486 (1930).
22. 3 CODE FED. REGS. Proc. 2668 (Supp. 1945).
23. For extended discussion of a typical example, see FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF
THE SEA 702 et seq. (1911).
the nationals of that government and thus may result in a competitive dis-
advantage to them. Only one fishery-sealing-has been successfully regu-
lated in the interest of conservation; 24 in the whaling industry even the
mass migration of the mammals from Arctic to Antarctic waters in search
of haven failed to produce any insistent demand for regulation, though by
1926 the herds were being reduced by over 10%o per year.25 The proposal
for a conservation code by the League of Nations Committee on the Codi-
fication of International Law in 1927 26 proved abortive, due to a number
of factors. To begin with, several of the States most interested opposed
any such code. Norway 2 7 and Sweden 28 felt that the causes of diminution
of species other than whales were too uncertain to permit effective control.
Great Britain, on the other hand, believed that regulation by treaty would
be more efficient than a general international convention 2 9-- a position
which Japan apparently shared.3 0 The United States relied on both these
reasons, stating that only the whaling industry either could or should be
governed by such a code. 1 The Committee's Rapporteur, M. Suarez, in-
sisted that this view was obsolete; that the regulatory treaties were "a
palliative but never a cure," creating a system which defeated its own ends
because, as in the case of whales, a given species migrated too often to
make such local measures effective for conservation purposes.3 2 He argued
also that treaty regulation was based on commercial interests and ignored
the biological considerations which he felt were of transcendent impor-
tance.
33
One major reason for the failure of this proposal was doubtless a
strong feeling on the part of the States most interested that they could
legally control most of the fisheries by unilateral action. Authorities such
as Vattel have maintained that a people having a particularly valuable
fishery near their shores should be "permitted to appropriate [it] . . . as
an appendage to the country they possess . . . ;" 34 and this theory has
been invoked in defense of the proclamation in question.3 5 But others insist
24. By the Bering Sea Fur Seal Convention, 37 STAT. 1542 (1911). The Interna-
tional Fisheries Commission and the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commis-
sion have effectively controlled American and Canadian salmon and halibut fishing
outside'Pacific territorial waters, but have not been able to prevent Japanese encroach-
ments. See infra, note 51 and text at note 46.
25. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, QUESTIONS WHICH APPEAR RIPE FOR INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION [hereinafter cited L.N. COD. REP.] 120, 123 (1927). For more recent
developments, see infra at note 79.
26. L.N. COD. REP. 120 (1927).
27. Id. at 172, 178.
28. Id. at 226,240.
29. Id. at 144, 146.
30. Id. at 172.
31. Id. at 160.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Ibid.
34. FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 560 (1911).
35. Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Maritime Belt, 40 Am. J. INT'L L.
173 (1946).
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that this view is only a cloak to cover an unjustifiable extension of ter-
ritorial waters, since any claim to an economic monopoly can be based only
on sovereign rights.36 The opposition between these two schools has led
to efforts toward extension of territorial waters for fishery purposes only.
Probably the most famous (and most successful) of these efforts is the
reservation of fishery rights in the Scotch King's Chambers, following the
Act of Union. 3T But more significant here are the twentieth century sug-
gestions, such as those by the various International Fishery Congresses
prior to 1926, that territorial waters be extended for fishery purposes to a
belt of twelve or fifteen miles. The basis of this proposal was that no
regulation could succeed unless based on "economic control and supervision
by the State whom such measures concern"--ordinarily the littoral State-
and that a territorial belt of twelve or fifteen miles would place the con-
tinental shelf of each State within its own territorial waters.38  This theory
is surprisingly inaccurate geographically, since the continental shelf-the
flat shallow areas of ocean bottom forming a geological extension of the ter-
ritory of a coastal State-is in some instances well over 100 miles wide 3 9
But otherwise it is an extremely logical argument for expansion of the
territorial belt, being derived from the reason for its very existence. Ter-
ritorial waters are recognized as necessary to the defense of the adjacent
shore. 40 This necessity for self-protection is extended by some authorities
to preservation of commercial interests including fisheries.4 1 The doctrine
of territorial waters is based also on the inexhaustible wealth of the high
seas-inexhaustible goods being, since Roman times, incapable of appropri-
ation. When this wealth is shown to be exhaustible, as M. Suarez did in
his report, it becomes ipso facto appropriable. 42
But no such theory would explain the proclamation completely; be-
cause the striking fact is that it is declared applicable "in those areas of
the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States," without any
limitation as to maximum distances considered "contiguous." 43 If Pro-
fessor Bingham is correct, the principal area contemplated is comparable
to the British King's Chambers; 44 but the uncertainty exists nevertheless,
36. SMITH, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 17 (1948) ; cf. JESSUP, LAW OF TER-
RITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 20 (1927).
37. FULTON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 226 et seq., 548.
38. L.N. COD. REP. 188, 192 (1927).
39. Estimates vary within wide limits. In reporting the proclamation, Newsweek
gives the extent as 253 miles, Business Week as 105 miles. Newsweek, Oct. 8, 1945,
p. 74; Bus. Wk., Oct. 6, 1945, p. 42.
40. LINDLEY, ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BAcKWARD TERRITORY 61 (1926);
BUSTAMANTE Y SIRVEN, THE TERRITORIAL SEA 31 (1930).
41. And even to prevention of infringement of the laws of the littoral State re-
gardless of the scene of the action. POTTER, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 103 (1924).
42. LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 61.
43. It is interesting to compare with this claim the British Territorial Waters
jurisdiction Act of 1878. claiming jurisdiction "to such a distance as is necessary for
the defense and security" of the coastal area, and the Presidential announcement that
United States territorial waters extend "as far as our interests require." Masterson,
The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law, 26 A.B.A.J. 860 (1940).
44. Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, 40 AM. J. INT'L L.
173, 175 (1946).
and the companion proclamation's direct reference to the continental shelf
has led many people to feel that all fisheries in waters above shelf areas were
affected. The recent agitation for just such a rule of law has contributed
to this impression; and it is not impossible that those responsible for the
proclamation intended the uncertainty, as a foundation for future extensions
us and if such became practical. 45 But this may well be an obstacle to ac-
ceptance of the claim by other nations.
The theory has been stated that "contiguous areas" are the habitats of
fish which return to the territorial waters of the United States to spawn.
This would seem to be supported by contemporary reports, which give as
the cause for. the proclamation the fear of renewed Japanese incursions into
the Bristol Bay salmon fisheries. 46 But it is important, if this is the founda-
tion for the policy, to recall that similar claims were specifically rejected
by the arbitrators in the Bering Sea Fur Seals dispute.4 7  Nor can a claim
on this theory be based on an analogy to the sedentary fisheries. Claims to
sedentary fisheries have been recognized for centuries,48 and it is conceded
that they are essentially claims to habitats. But they are accepted in inter-
national law almost entirely on a prescriptive basis, and hence cannot be
considered as precedents for the present policy.49 The United States was
well advised to couch its claim in other terms, and thus avoid tangling with
the Bering Sea precedent while gaining unofficial support from the Euro-
pean sources already mentioned. "Habitat" might be the innuendo, but
"shelf" is more likely to be the legal effect. Indeed, a large part of the con-
servation zones which have been defined pursuant to the proclamation coin-
cide with the area of the continental shelf.?°
One other clause of the proclamation deserves special notice. Provi-
sion is made for agreements as to conservation zones and regulations be-
tween the United States and such other States as have established
"legitimate" interests in a given fishery area-a sort of condominium of the
sea. At first glance this seems absolutely equitable. But "all" fishing ac-
tivities in such zones are to be subject to the regulations promulgated under
the agreements, even though carried on by nationals of States not parties
to the agreements. No principle of international law is known by which
two States may by agreement gain regulatory jurisdiction over the nationals
of a third State, where they would not have such jurisdiction in the absence
of the agreement. The exercise of such jurisdiction would in all probability
evoke loud and justified protest from the third State.51
45. Brittin, Inter ational Law Aspects of the Acquisition of the Continental Shelf
by the United States, 74 PRoc. U.S. NAVAL INST. 1541 (1948).
46. Newsweek, Oct. 8, 1945, p. 74.
47. Borchard, Resources of the Continental Shelf, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 53, 63
(1946).
48. Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRit. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 40 (1923-24).
49. Lindley, op. cit. supra note 40 at 68.
50. Brittin, supra note 45, at 1541.
51. Meyer insists that the parties to the Bering Sea Fur Seals Convention "would
not allow sealing by the ships of other nations in the sea areas which are included
in the Treaty as long as the prohibition is in force for their own subjects. . . . The
treaty is based accordingly on the assumption that the four contracting parties have
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Thus under any theory this proclamation is an extension of existing
fishery jurisdiction. It is directly contrary to the interpretation put on the
concept of freedom of the seas by the Institute of International Law, which
included the right to fish anywhere on the high seas under the "exclusive
control . . . of the State whose flag the vessel flies," absent contrary
treaty provisions. 52 Bingham calls it, in plain terms, a warning to for-
eigners not to invade our coasts, and thinks that foreigners generally will
heed it.53 This seems to be an cptimistic statement, based on his supposi-
tion that communication with those States most likely to be affected pre-
ceded announcement of the policy.54 The supposition is not illogical,
especially in view of the recognition by the proclamation itself of the "special
rights and equities" of any State "which may have established a legitimate
interest" in the area involved.55 But such communication would strengthen
the tendency, only too apparent in the proclamation, to "freeze" fishery
interests as of the status quo. Recent events have shown the danger of such
a policy in any field of international interests. It is particularly so in mari-
time affairs-a field which is traditionally free to all.
RIGHTS OVER THE SUBMARINE CRUST "6
The proclamation on subsoil resources states that
the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to
the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental
shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an ad-
jacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States
and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. The
character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and
the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
affected. 5
7
At the time of issuance this was only slightly more in accord with accepted
international practice than its companion proclamation; subsequent events
an exclusive and actual right to make regulations for sealing throughout the whole
Pacific north of 300 N." MEYER, EXTENT OF JURISDICTION IN COASTAL WATERS 262
(1937). But though this may be the practical effect, it cannot be considered grounds
for legal exclusion of nationals of any State which chooses to flout the treaty.
52. Resolutions Adopted at Lausanne (Navigation on the High Seas), 22 AM. J.
INT'L L. (Spec. Supp.) 336 (1928).
53. Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, 40 AM. J. INT'L L,
173, 176 (1946).
54. Id. at 177.
55. Young states that communication was sent to Great Britain, Canada, Mexico,
and the U.S.S.R., none of which "is known to have made any public objection." Re-
cent Developments With Respect to the Continental Shelf, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 849
(1948).
56. The phrase "submarine crust" is used herein to indicate the combination of
the sea bed and the subsoil, referred to separately in the proclamation. The expres-
sion "submarine areas" as used in the Gulf of Paria Treaty is considered inadequate,
since the thing referred to is a volume rather than an area.
57. 3 CODE FED. PEGS. Proc. 2667 (Supp. 1945).
have indicated a recognition of its principles as basically sound and desirable.
Resources of the sea bed, as for example the Ceylon pearl beds, have
been claimed as national monopolies from time immemorial.5 s Claims to
subsoil minerals, such as the coalfields off Cornwall, are only slightly more
recent. In both cases the standard jurisdictional limits have been dis-
regarded. There are numerous reasons for this. Fundamentally, such
claims are recognized because they present no obstacles to freedom of
navigation, 59 and because only a monopoly by the coastal State will make
the utilization of such resources possible.60 Purely on the basis of self-
protection, a littoral government could not permit exploitation of these
resources, involving semi-permanent installations near its coasts, except
on its own terms.
If, then, such resources can in practice be exploited only by the lit-
toral State, will international law permit such exploitation?
The United States claims only "jurisdiction and control" of the "re-
sources of the subsoil and sea bed" of the contiguous continental shelf.
Thus in two ways the claim may be minimized in argument. It has been
suggested that the jurisdiction includes only the resources in the subsoil,
and not the subsoil itself. This of course is mere sophistry; one may as
logically claim the maple syrup and the wood while denying any inter-
est in the tree.0 1 But the other argument has more force. "Jurisdiction
and control," say the apologists, is far different from "sovereignty ;" and
though international law does not tolerate sovereignty outsde the territorial
belt it has in many cases accepted claims of jurisdiction for certain pur-
poses. This is, however, a distinction without a difference. Writers have
often tried to hide claims to sovereignty under other terminology, but the
substantive differences are negligible.62  Sovereignty may be limited, as
by rights of passage, but this limited sovereignty is basically the legal effect
of such terms as "jurisdiction and control." 63 A claim to such inter-
mediate rights must for this reason be treated as a claim to sovereignty
itself; if the latter cannot be recognized by international law it is difficult
if not impossible to support the former.64
Sovereignty is sometimes acknowledged over portions of the sub-
marine crust, as cited above, regardless of ordinary jurisdictional limits.
Prior to the present claim, the areas involved were small.6 5 But the prin-
ciple is important that international law permits such claims in some cases.
Apparently they are recognized so long as there is no interference with
freedom of navigation, and to the extent that occupation is effective. The
58. LINDLEY, ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY 68 (1926).
59. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
60. Colborn, National Jurisdiction Over Resources of the Continental Shelf, 82
BULL. PAN-AM. UNION 38 (1948).
61. Vallat, The Continental Shelf, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 336 (1946).
62. BUSTAMANTE Y SravEN, THE TERRITORIAL SEA 26 et seq. (1930).
63. Cf. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 59, at 257. The confusion of the terms in
the foreign successors of this proclamation is noted infra at note 91.
64. Hurst, The Continental Shelf, 2 INT'L L.Q. 640 (1948).
65. But see JEssuP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
17n (1927).
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test of "effective" occupation is either fortification or "cultivation," which
latter includes exploitation of minerals. 6  At present there has been no
such occupation of substantial areas of the continental shelf by the United
States, but the intent to do so as rapidly as is technologically possible
has been made quite clear, and will undoubtedly be carried into effect.6 7
Thus the requirements for acquisition of territory will have been met. But
the issue is the applicability of those requirements to the continental shelf.
One writer insists that the analogy from control over limited areas such
as the sedentary fisheries is inconclusive, not only because of the vast
difference in the size of the claim but also because the shelf claim involves
too many undefined resources, exploitation of many of which is impossible
without advances in technology now undreamed of.68 But this is too nega-
tive an approach. If the bases for limitations of sovereignty over the high
seas are inapplicable, such sovereignty should be permitted by international
law. These bases are three-fold.
Capacity to control.-Maritime dominion has been rejected because
exclusive control--"effective occupation"-has never been possible. Since
the seventeenth century, when Portugal failed to keep Grotius' compatriots
out of the Indies, no State has seriously attempted the continuous posses-
sion of the high seas or their subsoil. But such attempts are now being
made, and as methods of appropriating the continental shelf become prac-
ticable this argument against their appropriability loses force. 69
Interest in free navigation.-The desire of all nations to share the
world's commerce has led to loud objections when one dominant State
has tried to monopolize any portion of such commerce by means of bar-
riers to navigation. 70 But exploitation of the continental shelf would be
no more obstructive than the coalfields of Cornwall or the Florida sponge
fisheries, unless permanent installations for entry from above were in-
volved. A pipeline across the ocean would be indefensible; but in most
cases the products could be stored on platforms constructed at the point
of extraction, pending transfer to shore by ship. The "islands" involved
in such operations would be no more obstructive to navigation than coral
atolls. Indeed, many authorities insist that only political obstructions to
navigation are illegal, and that a physical obstacle is unobjectionable. The
66. LINDLEY, AcQUISITION AND GOVERNMAENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY 139
(1926). Lindley would recognize such a claim only after "governmental control" is
established; but in an area where there are no inhabitants to control, exploitation
would seem to be a more appropriate test of occupation.
67. Intent to appropriate is sufficient to convey sovereignty, without actual pos-
session, in cases such as unexplored areas, deserts, craters of volcanoes, etc. The test
thus appears to be not actual possession but the ability to prevent possession by others.
68. Hurst, supra note 64.
69. SmITH, LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 61 (1948); BUSTAMANTE Y SIRVEN,
THE TERRITORIAL SEA 28 (1930); Brittin, International Law Aspects of the Acquirsi-
tion of the Continental Shelf by the United States, 74 PROC. U.S. NAVAL INST. 1541
(1948).
70. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
line is difficult to draw.71 But in view of the history of the concept of free
navigation the distinction seems valid, and would serve to excuse reason-
able obstructions necessary to the utilization of the minerals available.
Necessity: the interest in security.-Sovereignty over territorial waters
is permitted because the littoral State must exclude others in the interest
of its own security and "the preservation of the advantages derived from
the territorial sea." 72 By the same token, rights in territorial waters are
subject to such limitations as do not endanger the security of the sovereign,
principally innocent passage and restrictions as to width. Permanent in-
stallations of a potential enemy, of the type necessary to exploitation of
submarine oil fields, would be intolerable within the continental shelf. Yet
under international law such installations can be excluded by the littoral
State only under rights tantamount to sovereignty over the area involved. 3
Therefore the confinement of maritime sovereignty to a three-mile belt is
inadequate for this purpose, and should be relaxed in regard to submarine
crust resources.
The proposition is best stated by Jessup's assertion that claims beyond
the three-mile limit are acquiesced in when reasonable. 74 Certainly a claim
to an area which is geologically a continuation of the territory of the littoral
State is "reasonable" if, without unduly obstructing navigation, its recog-
nition will facilitate use of great quantities of submarine resources peaceably
and with due regard to their conservation.7 5 Indeed, it could be argued
that such claims should be recognized without actual possession. The only
alternative seems to be to recognize title by possession to all of the sub-
marine crust up to the edge of another State's territorial waters, and thus
encourage a wasteful scramble for possession of vast areas purely on the
chance that they might someday be productive of something.
7 6
These, then, are the arguments in favor of acceptance of the proc-
lamation as a rule of international law: conservation, avoidance of juris-
dictional strife, the analogy to occupation of unclaimed territory, and the
inapplicability of the reasons for limiting maritime sovereignty. Assuming
them to be valid, the problem remains over what areas the proclamation is
effective.
The term continental shelf has no defined limits in law. Its boundaries
are clear enough around the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States,
where the ocean floor slopes gradually to a depth of about 100 fathoms and
then drops off sharply, creating a clear "shelf" formation. But the effect
of the proclamation in areas such as the Bay of Fundy (whose bottom is
mountainous) and the Florida-Bahamas area (where there are shallow
71. Would a pontoon bridge across the Strait of Gibraltar be political or physical?
Might not the answer depend in part on whether it were Spain or Mexico that
objected?
72. BUSTAMANTE Y SmvEN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 28, 31.
73. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 69, at 17.
74. LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION -xXxiv (1927).
75. Colborn, National Jurisdiction Over Resources of the Continetal Shelf, 82
BULL. PAN-Am. UNION 38 (1948).
76. 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 70, at 577.
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banks showing strong likelihood of petroleum deposits and yet outside of
true shelf areas) is difficult to determine. The press release which ac-
companied the proclamation treated the continental shelf as synonymous
with areas covered by less than 100 fathoms of water. 77 But again, there
remains the possibility of future interpretation and expansion, should ex-
ploitation of deeper areas become possible.
THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION
Since both policies represent broader national jurisdiction in their
respective fields than has customarily been recognized by international law,
it is significant to determine the necessity for that expansion. It must be
conceded that some form of regulation is necessary as soon as practicable.
The issue is between national and international control; opposition to the
new policies of the United States centers in a demand for an International
Waters Office.78 Thus it is not surprising that the proclamations em-
phasize the need for regulation, while the only mention of the possibility
or feasibility of multilateral action is the reference in the fisheries declara-
tion to "careful study" of "the jurisdictional basis for . . . international
co-operation in this field"-and even this is a lead to the recognition of the
existing interests of other States.
This studied silence is deceptive. Actually fishery conservation is a
field in which considerable advances can be made in international co-
operation. Only a year after the United States established its unilateral
conservation zones, representatives of fifteen nations signed an Inter-
national Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. This document, which
has been ratified or adhered to by thirteen States, sets up an International
Whaling Commission, with power to fix the number and size of whales
taken each season and establish conservation zones and seasons. The
Commission may adjust its regulations from time to time so as to achieve
the optimum level of stocks.79 Thus the multilateral conservation which
in 1927 was premature is now becoming a reality, at least as regards
cetaceans, and it is highly significant that the States which have ratified
the Whaling Convention include those which in 1927 felt that the informa-
tion on which regulation could be based was inadequate. 0 Concededly the
Convention and the United States proclamation operate in different areas;
but the Convention, if successful, could and should be a model for future
international regulation of other species. It is unfortunate that the uni-
laterally declared policy of the United States is maintenance of the status
quo, in an area where multilateral regulation could be much more effective
and more in keeping with the American ideals of free seas and free enter-
prise. Undoubtedly this is one reason for the fact that no other State has
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either recognized the United States' claim or made similar claims of its
own.
That the fishery proclamation is without subsequent recognition or
imitation is even more striking when contrasted with the international re-
action to the submarine crust proclamation. But the principles involved
are vastly different, and that difference is the most significant factor in
the international reaction. The distinction lies in the nature of the industry
affected. Fishing is primarily a field of small entrepreneurs, in which the
only large-scale investment is the cannery. In most of the areas affected
by the proclamation, there is no direct connection between the fisherman
and his customer; 81 they deal at arm's length and hence the nationality
of one is largely immaterial to the other. Petroleum, on the other hand, is
highly integrated vertically; the nationality of the driller in large measure
determines the nationality of the refiner. This factor makes international
control of the submarine petroleum pools highly impractical; the enormous
investment needed to begin operations precludes participation by any but the
entrenched nationals of a few States, and in such a situation regulation
on a unilateral basis or at best by treaty between the two or three States
interested in each pool is much preferable to attempts at general inter-
national agreements. This becomes even more apparent when the strategic
nature of petroleum is taken into account. No State will be willing to put
its supply of oil from any source under the control of a body comparable to
the International Whaling Commission, much less to conform to yearly
quotas, if it has any feeling of insecurity whatever. It is also important that
the limited nature of property rights in fish as ferrae naturae makes con-
servation impossible among fishermen, whose only means of conservation
is government control. On the other hand, technology has made the petro-
leum industry its own conservation officer; the self-interest of the owners
fixes the amount extracted from a given pool each year, provided the
driller's property interest in the well is protected 82 -again, a task best
performed by a single State. Thus no government, national or inter-
national, can contribute to the conservation of petroleum; it can only make
exploitation possible by protecting the investments involved. In this light,
State sovereignty over submarine oil fields is probably the most reasonable
method of making these resources available to man, and the same reasons
would apply with varying degrees of force to other resources of the sub-
marine crust.
The United States policy, then, is apparently the answer to the problem
of how best to encourage economic exploitation of the submarine crust.
Yet it has been criticised, on the grounds that it is an unprecedented ex-
tension of maritime sovereignty. This is not strictly accurate; the procla-
mation makes no claim to maritime sovereignty but only to submarine con-
trol.8 3 And even the provision of the continental shelf as the area affected
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is not completely without precedent. The French jurist Valin, writing in
1760, was probably the earliest proponent of a maritime belt based on
depth. At that time there was of course little awareness of the configura-
tion now known as the continental shelf; Valin's suggested limit was the
depth to which a sounding line would reach.8 4 This would be a much
narrower area than is generally considered today as the shelf, and in any
case the date of the proposal makes its precedential value slight indeed.
More significant is the claim by the Czar to certain uninhabited islands
North of Siberia as a "continuation of the Siberian continental shelf." The
claim was renewed by the U. S. S. R. in 1924, on the same basis, and no
protest is known to have been made by any other State. 5
A more convincing precedent is the Gulf of Paria Treaty of 1942, be-
tween the United Kingdom and Venezuela. 6  This compact divided the
Gulf by an arbitrary North-South line, and each party agreed not to assert
any claims whatever to the area allotted to the other. No assertions of
sovereignty or control were made by the treaty, but such positive claims
were rendered unnecessary by the assumption that non-signatory States
would not intervene in the Gulf. Such assumption is probably correct
in the particular case, since there is very little navigation affected and no
other State would find it practical to extract the resources underlying the
waters of the Gulf.87
Two things about the treaty are closely comparable to the United
States policy, viz., the limitations of its effectiveness to the subsoil of the
Gulf and the prohibition of any (physical) obstruction to navigation.88
The distinction is, of course, that the Paria treaty admits nothing more
than the rights of the signatories inter se. The technical mind would add
that the treaty affects only the subsoil of a gulf, while the United States
claim involves that of an ocean. But the fact of a division of the sub-
marine crust subjacent to an area of high seas remains; and to this extent
the treaty is valid precedent for the proclamation, in that two other nations
have recognized that the character of a given area as high seas is not a bar
to rights in the subsoil. It is of interest to add that both parties to the
treaty have purported to annex their respective portions of the submarine
crust of the Gulf.8 9
There is, however, not enough force in any of these sources to sup-
port the proclamation. As arguments they have some value, but the proc-
lamation cannot be sustained against the established usage of international
law on the strength of such dubious authorities, unless the community of
nations accepts it on its merits. Actually, this seems to be what is hap-
pening. Since the date of the announcement, similar claims have been made
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by six of the Latin American States, two British Crown Colonies in the
Caribbean, Saudi Arabia, and the Trucial States bordering the Persian
Gulf. In addition, legislation along the same lines is known to have been
proposed in Iran and Cuba.90 The declarations by Jamaica, the Bahamas,
and the Trucial States indicate British acceptance of the principle. No
objections are known to have been heard from any quarter, on an official
level. Thus the conclusion seems to be that the principle espoused by the
United States in 1945 will rapidly gain general acceptance as international
law on the basis of its desirability, regardless of the lack of precedential
support.
Naturally, the declarations show many points of difference. Conflict
appears between the claims to "jurisdiction and control" by the United
States, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia and those to "sovereignty" by Argentina,
Chile, Nicaragua, and Peru; the situation is further complicated by the
Trucial States' assertion that the contiguous areas "belong to . . . and
are subject to its absolute authority and jurisdiction;" and Jamaica and
the Bahamas simply "extended the boundaries" of the respective colonies.
But these differences are, as has been said,91 more verbal than substantial.
More significant is the distinction based on the effect of the various
proclamations on the seas themselves. All have as their primary purpose
assertion of claims to the submarine crust; but those of Argentina, Chile,
and Peru refer to the continental shelf and the epicontinental sea, and the
pending amendments to the Mexican Constitution designed to implement
the decree assert "direct ownership" of the continental shelf and the sub-
jacent waters "to the extent fixed by international law." Possibly these
are intended only to combine in a single document the claims which the
United States asserted in two simultaneous proclamations. But they in-
dicate by their terms an intent to extend the limits of territorial waters,
and the variation is notable even though all the claims made to date promise
no interference with freedom of the seas.
The major distinction, however, cannot be so easily dismissed. This
is the areas affected by the various proclamations. Of the announcements
to date, those by the United States, Latin and British America, and the
proposed Iranian legislation speak of the continental shelf. The United
States and British America leave it undefined, though in the case of the
United States the accompanying press release cites a depth of 100 fathoms.
Mexico's claim to 200 meters is approximately the same depth. Cuban
proposed legislation refers to the shelf up to a depth of 200 fathoms. Ar-
gentina, while speaking of the shelf, claims also that its sovereignty now
extends from the Rio de la Plata to the South Pole; and while there
are connecting geological structures joining Cape Horn and Antarctica
the intervening seas are deeper than commonly accepted shelf configura-
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tions. The most Startling boundaries are those of Chile, Peru, and Costa
Rica, whose claims are expressed as extending 200 miles from shore re-
gardless of depth-in spite of references in the pronouncements to the
"continental shelf."
The Near Eastern claims are much more consistent. The claimants
there are all interested in the Persian Gulf, and this is less a shelf area
than a basin within the continent of Asia. Hence only the pending legis-
lation by Iran mentions a shelf; the others speak of submarine areas con-
tiguous to the coasts, and all indicate that boundaries within the narrow
Gulf will be settled by international consultation. This procedure will
presumably be the same for all the narrow seas as claims to their sub-
marine crusts are asserted, especially the North Sea, the Baltic, and the
Black Sea; and settlement of particular issues will probably be a com-
paratively simple problem.
Definition of the continental shelf will not be so simple, though as a
toncept it is not difficult of comprehension. The term refers to the
fairly level and fairly shallow areas contiguous to most submerged coasts,
at the edge of which (at a depth of approximately 100 fathoms or 200
meters) the decline of the ocean floor becomes much more precipitate.
It is thus as easy to determine its bounds as it is in the case of a mountain
range or a desert. But this peculiar geological phenomenon is not found on
all coasts. Most of the Western coast of the Americas has no shelf,
but drops rapidly to very great depths-as much as 5000 feet within
thirty miles of shore. Considering this, it is not surprising to find that
Chile and Peru, while speaking of the continental shelf, expressly claim
jurisdiction on a basis other than a shelf theory, since a claim to their
continental shelves would be a claim to a non-existent area. Their con-
tinental shelves are too narrow to be of any real significance.
Thus what originated as a plan to facilitate exploitation of submarine
resources has become what its opponents feared-the basis for claims to
exceedingly wide maritime belts. These claims may speak of the resources
involved, but most of those resources are not practically obtainable at depths
over 50 to 75 fathoms. Chile's claim may be an attempt to gain control
over the Chilean Rise-a plateau-like area some distance from the coast,
which might be considered a shelf if it were geologically linked to the
mainland-and as such it is entitled to consideration. It may be that such
non-contiguous banks can be effectively and profitably exploited by the
nearest State; and the fact that the first claims to the submarine crust
were expressed in shelf terms should not blind anyone to other possibili-
ties. If claims unsupported by a shelf theory present the most economical
and equitable method of utilizing a given area, then on the basis of the
foregoing discussion they should be recognized. The shelf is too new a
concept in international law to be blindly adhered to in all cases.
Nonetheless, the phrasing of the Chilean and Peruvian declarations
should not be given international approval without close scrutiny. A claim
to the resources of the Chilean Rise may be reasonable; a claim to the
submarine crust within a 200-mile radius of the coast regardless of depth
is not, since present technology has no expectation of being able to exploit
resources at such depths. Particularly when combined with a "confir-
mation" of sovereignty over the epicontinental sea, such a claim is remark-
ably similar to an assertion that the territorial waters extend to that dis-
tance. This is precisely the end predicted by Lt. Commdr. Brittin in dis-
cussing the United States proclamation. 92 But such claims have been
resisted on numerous occasions in the past century; adoption of a new
verbal formula should not change the result. The continental shelf theory,
insofar as it facilitates exploitation of resources useful to man, and pro-
vided it does not interfere with the primary value of the oceans as high-
ways, can develop into a new rule of international law based on reason and
equity. But any attempt to pervert it into a means of restricting the basic
concept of freedom of the high seas must be decisively rejected by the
community of nations.93 No nation can long profit from a restriction of
that concept, even though the restriction be in its own favor.
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